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ABSTRACT 
We re-examine the notion of consumer rationality in transition economies by 
modifying the conventional non-parametric tests of the axioms of revealed preference. 
To reflect the unique characteristics of transition economies, shortages are allowed in the 
state market, while not in the private market. 
Because of the way the modified tests are constructed, data for prices in both the 
state and private markets are needed, as are data on purchases from state markets. 
Through some convenient algebraic substitutions, the tests do not require data on actual 
quantities purchased in the private markets. This feature of the modified tests is 
especially important, given the near impossibility of gaining access to data on sales or 
purchases from private markets in transition economies. 
Using limited aggregate consumption data for four important food items in five 
cities of the former Soviet Union, we clearly demonstrate that conventional non­
parametric tests can lead to an erroneous rejection of the rationality hypothesis of 
consumer behavior for economies in transition. 
• 
• Araz Mekhtiev and Richard N. Boisvert are former graduate student and professor, respectively, in the 
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, Cornell University. We thank Loren 
Tauer for helpful comments, but any remaining errors or omissions are our own. 
Non-parametric Tests of Consumer Behavior in Transition Economies 
By 
Araz Mekhtiev and Richard N. Boisvert· 
Introduction 
One of the major challenges for economists since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc 
is to understand the changes in consumer behavior as centrally planned economies (CPE) 
make the transition to more market-oriented economies. During the transition period, 
many of these economies have experienced severe shortages, stagflation, and the rapid 
development of alternative markets. These disturbances cause dramatic changes in 
consumption opportunities, which in turn affect consumer behavior. 
There is some limited empirical work suggesting that, during these transition 
period disturbances, consumer behavior may appear to be irrational and cannot be 
described as a result of utility maximization (Shananin, 199'0; 1993). Consumers in 
emerging markets, however, face a number of constraints in addition to a traditional 
budget constraint. Among the most important constraints in former Eastern Bloc 
countries are related to product availability, time, and product quality. To analyze the 
rationality of the consumer behavior in emerging markets, we must grasp the importance 
of these constraints and consider them explicitly in theoretical and empirical analyses. 
Under the fixed price system of the centrally planned economies, for example, 
consumers often fail to find goods they desire (Davis and Charernza, 1989). Shortages in 
-
the state supermarkets force consumers either to postpone their purchases or to revise ... 
• Araz Mekhtiev and Richard N. Boisvert are former graduate student and professor, respectively, in the 
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, Cornell University. 
initial demands and substitute alternative available goods. Hyperinflation, also a 
common characteristic of transition periods, encourages immediate spending and 
hoarding. 
The long queues outside state shops even when the desired goods are available 
certainly have affected demand formation and consumption behavior during the transition 
period. Since wages in the private sector are adjusted for inflation almost weekly, and 
working hours are flexible, consumers engaged in private sector employment are unlikely 
to spend much time waiting to make purchases in state shops, if an alternative exists. 
The rapid expansion of the private sector and the absence of salary inflation 
adjustments in the state sector have led to large income disparities. What was once a 
relatively homogeneous population is quickly divided into different income groups, and 
the gap between them widens rapidly. These huge income gaps have segmented consumer 
goods markets and, in turn, have led to the development and rapid expansion of private 
markets as alternatives to state shops. 
Product quality also may be higher in private markets, because producers want the 
higher prices for their best products. With fixed prices in the state shops, there are no 
incentives for managers of state shops to invest in product development; nor is there any 
incentive for efficiency in the central distribution system supplying state shops. The 
inferior quality of many perishable commodities may result from late deliveries due to the 
malfunctioning of the state transportation system. 
There are two kinds of buyers in the state shops: households and firms. In making 
­
purchases from state shops, households operate under effective budget constraints, and 
they cannot spend more than they have at their disposal. In contrast, even though state 
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fiIl11s are given budgets, they nOIl11ally purchase as much as they wish. In this case, both 
the seller and the buyer are under state control, and credit agreements between state 
enterprises are usually not enforced. The situation is again different in alternative 
markets where all buyers must operate within their budgets because all the sellers are 
private, profit maximizing agents. 
During times of shortage in the state shops, private supply is increased in order to 
absorb the existing excess demand. However, consumers increase their purchases 
expecting future shortages. As a result, shortages persist, a phenomenon that has its 
origins in the 1930' s, where demands for consumer goods often went unmet because of 
deliberate CPE state policies to stimulate industry, the main sector of the socialist 
economy. 
Shortages of goods have been studied within the context of a model of a shortage 
economy (Clower, 1965; Kornai, 1971, 1980) and within the context of disequilibrium 
models (e.g. the papers in Davis and Charernza, 1989), and others have focused on 
substitution, forced saving, and queues (e.g., Mekhtiev, 1997). No one has examined the 
effects of the existence of alternative markets on consumer behavior. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a method for investigating the economic 
rationality of consumer behavior in transition economies. To do so, the question of 
consumer rationality is re-examined within the context of there being an emerging private 
market. Put differently, we wish to know if explicit recognition of the existence of both 
-state and private markets in the examination of consumption data from state markets will 
..­
point to the rationality of consumer behavior when more conventional analysis of the data 
would suggest otherwise. 
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We examine this issue within the context of a non-parametric approach to 
consumer behavior. To recognize the existence of two markets in the test of the 
rationality hypothesis, we modify the non-parametric tests of the axioms of revealed 
preference, which were originally developed by Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982~ 1983). 
To reflect the unique characteristics of transition economies, shortages are allowed in one 
market, while private markets are assumed to clear. Because consumption data from 
private markets are generally not available, the real challenge is to construct modified 
tests which rely only on data on consumption from state shops and prices from both state 
and private markets. The method is demonstrated using aggregate consumption data from 
state markets for 1992-94 for four important food items in five cities of the former Soviet 
Union. 
To help describe how the existing non-parametric tests must be modified, we 
proceed with a brief reiteration of the conventional well known Weak and Generalized 
Axioms of Revealed Preference (WARP, GARP).1 We then characterize the two markets 
and develop the modified non-parametric tests. We present the results from an empirical 
application of the method and close with some final observations about their implications. 
The Conventional Non-parametric Tests 
The conventional non-parametric test of the hypothesis of consumer rationality 
checks to see if observed data are consistent with utility maximization through 
application of weak and generalized axioms of revealed preference (Varian, 1982). No 
• 
Driscoll and McGuirk (1997) modify these standard non-parametric tests to account for consumer 
perceptions of the fat content in investigating possible structural change in consumer demand for meat. 
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I 
explicit assumptions about the functional form of the demand system are required. Only 
observed data on prices and consumption are needed to detect violations of the axioms. 
Suppose for some number of time periods (t=l, ... ,T), we have data on price 
vectors and consumption bundles, (Pt. Xt). If there are N goods, Xt=(X/ ,Xt2, ... ,XtN) and 
Definition 1. An observed consumption bundle Xi is directly revealed preferred 
If the consumer chooses a bundle Xi at the prices Pi while bundle Xj is attainable 
at the same prices Pi with the same budget outlay, then bundle Xi is directly revealed 
preferred to bundle Xj. It is usually denoted XiRXj. 
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP): If bundle Xj is directly revealed 
preferred to bundle Xj, XjRXj , then Xj cannot be revealed preferred to Xi, not XjRXi. 
WARP, stated in terms of expenditures, is: 
If Xi is directly revealed preferred to Xj, then this implies that Xj should have been 
obtainable for a given budget outlay: 
(1) P-X- >P-X­I 1 - I J 
IfWARP is satisfied (XjRXj and not XjRXD, we know 
(2)
 
For the case of two goods, Figure 1 demonstrates situations in which WARP is satisfied 
and in which it is violated. At time period i, the ruling prices are Pi, and bundle Xi is 
-chosen. The budget line at this time i passes through bundle Xi. When the consumption 
... 
bundle Xj is chosen at the prices Pj, the budget line passes through bundle Xj. WARP is 
satisfied in this case as Xi was chosen while Xj was attainable and Xj was chosen while Xi 
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was not attainable. At prices Pi, WARP would be violated if Xk is chosen instead of Xi. 
In this case, Xk is chosen while Xj is attainable but Xj is chosen while Xk is still 
attainable. This is a violation of WARP. 
Figure 1: WARP 
Definition 2. An observed consumption bundle Xi is revealed preferred to a 
bundle Xj, denote XjPXj, if there exist a sequence of bundles (Xb Xm,... ,Xr), such that 
XjRXk, XkRXm,... ,XrRXj. 
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP): IfXi is revealed preferred 
to Xj, XjPXj, then Xj cannot be revealed preferred to Xi, not XlX i • 
GARP checks every possible transitive closure, while WARP compares only two 
observed bundles. A violation of WARP leads to a violation of GARP, but not vice versa. 
Definition 3. Utility function U(X) rationalizes the data (Pt, Xt), t=I, ... ,N, if 
U(Xt)~U(X)for all X such that PtX! ~ PtX. 
Afriat's Theorem: The following conditions are equivalent (Afriat, 1967): 
­
..­
• the data satisfy GARP; 
• there exist numbers Ui, Ai >0, i=I, ... ,N, such that Ui ~ uj +Ajpj(xj-Xj) for i,j=I,... ,N; 
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•	 there exists a non-satiated, continuous, concave, monotonic utility function that 
rationalizes the data. 
If the data satisfy GARP, then this implies that consumer choices are consistent 
with the hypothesis of utility maximization behavior. If the data produce no cases of 
GARP violation, then there exist a demand system that satisfies the general properties of 
neoclassical demand theory. 
The Modified Non-Parametric Tests to Account for a Second Market 
Behavior in the two markets. During the transition period from centrally planned 
to market-oriented economies, alternative markets develop, and consumers begin to 
incorporate them into their pUf<;:hasing decisions. Consumer demand formation can be 
characterized as follows. First, an initial demand is formed, and a shopping route is 
started to satisfy the initial demand. Second, a part of consumer's initial demand is 
realized at the state shops, as goods at the state shops are much cheaper than at alternative 
markets. Shortages of some goods at the state shops, however, are likely to prevent 
consumers from satisfying their entire initial demand. Since goods are always available at 
the alternative markets, the unsatisfied part of the initial demand can be purchased at the 
alternative market, but at higher prices. This is the key characteristic of the transition 
period, and it is in stark contrast to the pre-transition periods when goods are not 
available at the state shops and alternative markets, if they exist at all, have little or no 
capacity to accommodate the unsatisfied demand. 
• 
Given this nature of consumer demand formation during the transition period, the 
conventional non-parametric tests cannot be directly applied to price and consumption 
data from state markets to check the rationality of consumer behavior during the 
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transition period. Rather, non-parametric tests must be modified to account explicitly for 
the availability (or lack thereof) of goods in one market and the existence of an alternative 
market. Without such modifications, the hypothesis of rational consumer behavior could 
be rejected erroneously. 
To illustrate the difficulties with the conventional tests based only on price and 
consumption data from state shops, assume that the situation in the state shops is depicted 
in Figure 2.2 At time period i, prices are given by PiS (budget line AB). If there are no 
shortages at state shops in period i, suppose Xk s is chosen while X/ is attainable within 
the same budget constraint. Further, at time period j, with the ruling prices P/ (budget 
line CD), suppose that X/ is chosen while Xk s is still attainable within the same budget 
constraint. This observed behavior is similar to the example, depicted in Figure 1, which 
violated both WARP and GARP. Accordingly, application of the conventional tests 
(based on observed prices and quantities from state shops) would reject the hypothesis of 
rational behavior. 
However, suppose that in time period j there are shortages at the state shops, and 
X/ is purchased because there are shortages in the state shops, and bundle Xk s is not 
physically available for purchase, although it is attainable within the same budget 
constraint implied by prices Pj (e.g. P/X/ ~ P/Xk S). By taking into consideration potential 
purchases from private markets as well, behavior may be rational, despite the results of 
the conventional non-parametric tests. 
The critical question is: "How can we detect the true violations of rationality • 
.. 
during the transition period? We must look for the answer in the alternative market 
2 The superscript s andjrefer to prices and consumption at state and alternative markets, respectively. 
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where goods are always available during times of shortage in the state shops, and a part of 
consumer demand is realized there. 
Assume that at time j, the observed consumption bundle at the state shops is X/, 
then Cjj is the observed expenditure on the bundle X/ at the ruling state prices P/ : 
(3)
 
Now, let us look at the bundle Xk s at the same timej, with the ruling prices P/ at the state 
shops. The bundle Xk s is attainable within the same budget constraint. But, assume the 
bundle Xks is not entirely available at the state shop. Assume that the shortage is given by 
sX k1 - X/ in Figure 2. This part of the desired consumption bundle can only be 
purchased in the alternative market at time j, with the ruling prices p/ ~ P{ 
At the alternative market during time periodj, it will cost the consumer 
S sp/ (Xk1 - X/) to obtain the physically unavailable part of the consumption bundle X k , 
where Pj / is the price of good 1 at the alternative market. The physically available part of 
the bundle X ks can be obtained at the state shops for P/XjIS+ P/Xk2s, where PjIS, P/ are 
the prices of goods 1 and 2 at the state shops, respectively. Hence, the real cost of the 
consumption bundle Xks is: 
(4) PjlsX/+ Pj2sXk2s + Pj/(XklS-XjlS) =R\
 
Since prices in the alternative markets are higher than in state shops, we know that:
 
(5) Rjk > C} 
By substituting (3) and (4) into (5), and after some simplification we know that: 
S s S ­(6) (XkI - X/)P/> (Xj2s - X k2 )Pj2
..­
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Given the shortage in the state shops, in this case, the bundle Xk s can not be purchased for 
sthe budget represented by the line CD in figure 2, and the choice of bundle X/ over Xk 
purchased from state shops at time periodj should not be a violation of WARP. 
In more general terms, consumer behavior during times of shortage in state 
markets can be modeled easily within Comes' (1992) treatment of consumer theory with 
many constraints (pp. 167-186).3 He shows that the maximization problem in this case 
leads to the definition of a restricted indirect utility function. 
The modified tests. This example provides insights into how WARP should be 
modified in order to check the rationality of consumer behavior during the transition 
A 
Figure 2: MWARP 
o X/ D 
• 
3 The same false violation of WARP when looking only at purchases from state shops could result from an 
alternative behavioral scenario in which individuals buy some goods from 'private markets because the 
difference in prices is lower than the opportunity cost of time waiting in line to purchase goods in state 
shops. The indirect utility function in this case is also discusssed by Comes (1992, pp. 180-182). 
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period to a market-oriented economy. In extending non-parametric tests to two markets 
(state and alternative), we might need data on prices and consumption from state market, 
(PiS,XiS), as well as data on prices and consumption from the alternative market, (P/,X/). 
Data from state shops, both price and consumption, could be easily obtained. Data on 
prices from alternative markets could obtained, too. However, as one might know, it is 
almost impossible to obtain data on consumption from alternative markets. Thus, an 
important feature of the modifications of non-parametric tests described below is that 
they do not require consumption data from the alternative market. To begin, we modify 
the definitions of the directly revealed preferred: 
Definition r (modified): An observed consumption bundle XjS IS directly 
-
where (XjkS-XjkS)+ and (X/-XitS). are positive and negative elements of the row of XrXj • 
The first constraint in Definition l' assumes that the entire bundle X/ is physically 
available for purchase at the state shops during time period i.4 On the other hand, the 
second constraint in Definition l' takes care of the case when the bundle X/ is not 
entirely physically available for purchase at the state shops during time period i. The 
positive elements of XrXj reflect the shortages, while the absolute values of negative 
elements reflect additional purchases at state shops as substitutes for goods for which 
there are shortages.5 
4 At time period i, the bundle XiS has been entirely physically available at the shops because this consump­

tion bundle has been observed.
 
5 From equations (3) through (6), it is clear that for the case of two goods, a violation of conventional
 
WARP always satisfies modified WARP, but this is not the case for more than two goods.
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Modified Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (MWARP): If XjSR'X/, then it 
is not the case when X/R'Xr
 
In tenus of expenditures, MWARP implies:
 
sIf PisXi ~ PisX/ and P/X/ > P/Xis, then Lk(X/-XikS)+ Pj/ + Lt(XjtS-XitS). PitS >0 
and Lk(XikS-XjkS). Pi/ + Lt(XitS-X/)+ PitS <0, 
Definition 2'(modified): An observed consumption bundle Xis is revealed 
Spreferred to a bundle Xj, XiP'Xj, if there exist a sequence of bundles (Xk , Xms, ... ,X/), 
Modified Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (MGARP): If Xi IS 
revealed preferred to Xj, XjP'Xj, then Xj cannot be revealed preferred to Xi, not XjP'Xi. 
Conducting the modified tests. The application of the modified non-parametric 
tests is straightforward. We begin by conducting the conventional tests of WARP and 
GARP. The test for WARP is as follows. Let there be n=l,...,N commodities and 
t=l, ... ,T time periods. We denote the matrix of prices and consumption as P[T,N] and 
X[T,N], respectively. The entries Pij of P matrix present the price of good j at time period 
i. The entries Xij of X matrix present the amount of consumption of good j at time period 
i. Furthenuore, a matrix of expenditures E[T,T] is then constructed with entries 
eij=LjXijPij. Each element Eij represents the e~penditure on the consumption bundle Xi of 
the ith period at the prices of the jth period. The diagonal entries of E present the actual 
observed expenditures in each period i. 
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Now, we introduce a matrix of ratios R[T,T] with entries rij=ei/ejj. If element 
rij~l, then Xj is directly revealed preferred to Xi, i.e. bundle Xi was attainable at the prices 
of the period j, but bundle Xj was chosen. If rij~l and rji~l, then we have a violation of 
WARP. For further purposes, let us define matrix W[T,T] that shows violations of 
WARP. The elements of W will be 1 if there is a violation of WARP and °otherwise, so 
1, if rij~l and rji~l 
0, otherwise. 
In tests for GARP, we check the transitivity with a matrix M[T,T] with entries: 
1, if rij~l 
(8) mij = { 
0, otherwise. 
Now, the algorithm suggested in Varian (1982) can be applied. We create a matrix 
MT[T,T] with entries: 
1, if mik= 1 and mkj= 1 
(9) mtjj= { 
0, otherwise. 
GARP is violated if mtij=l and mtji=1. For further purposes let us define matrix G[T,T] 
that shows violations of GARP. The elements of G will be 1 if there is a violation of 
GARP and °otherwise, so: 
1, if mtij= 1 and mtji= 1 
0, otherwise. 
The GAMS codes for WARP and GARP are given in Appendix A. 
-Having obtained the matrices of violations of WARP and GARP, W[T,T] and 
... 
G[T,T], we proceed to extend non-parametric test~ of consumer behavior to two, state and 
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alternative, markets. Examples from Figure 2 and definitions l' and 2' are the basis for 
the modification. 
The following algorithm explains how MWARP and MGARP work. 
Algorithm for MWARP (MGARP): 
A.	 Detect a violation of the conventional WARP (GARP), wiigij)=1 in the matrix W(G). 
B.	 Make a row Fij by subtracting consumption row of time period j, from the 
consumption row of time period i:
 
Fij [ I ,T] = Xi[1,T]-Xj[ I,T]
 
C.	 Form a new row of prices, Hij[ 1,T]. 
If the kth element of Fij is positive, then the kth element of the new price row, hk, is 
equal to the element p/ of the matrix of alternative market prices, otherwise hk is 
equal to pjkS element of the matrix of state shops prices. 
D.	 Calculate Mij and Mji as follows: 
TMij = Fij Hij 
E.	 If Mij >0 and Mji >0, then there is no violation of the modified WARP(GARP), 
although the conventional WARP(GARP) is violated. 
The elements of matrices reflecting violations of MWARP, MW[T,T], and 
MGARP, GW[T,T], are given by: 
1, if Wij= 1 and Mji<O and Mij < 0 
(11)	 mWij= { 
0, otherwise, and 
-
..­
0, otherwise. 
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The matrices MW[T,T] and MG[T,T] assign 1 if there is a violation of modified WARP 
or GARP, and 0 otherwise. 
An Application 
To apply these modified tests using data from the Russian Federation, we begin by 
conducting the conventional non-parametric tests, WARP and GARP. We then find 
violation cases of WARP and GARP, and subject them to the modified WARP and 
GARP to test the true violations of WARP and GARP during the transition period. 
The Data. The data used in this illustration of the new non-parametric methods 
were obtained from the Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation. They are 
aggregate prices and consumption data for: meat, milk, eggs, and potatoes.6 These annual 
data are from five cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Krasnodar, Khabarovsk) for 
3 years (1992, 1993, 1994). Per capita consumption at the state shops, for these 15 data 
points, are given in Table 1, while state market prices for these goods are in Table 2. 
Fortunately, we were also able to obtain data on the prices at the alternative 
market and they are presented in Table 3. As might be expected, these prices are from 
two or three times higher than those at state shops. Although some data points in Table 3 
are missing, we do make use of the information available in conducting the modified non­
parametric tests. 
-

6 Since the data cover only these four food items and not other budget items, standard separability assump­
tions must be made to apply the modified tests. These goods must be weakly separable from the other 
goods not represented, and various types of meat must be homothetically separable from other food so that 
one can define a meat aggregate (Driscoll and McGuirk, 1997; Diewert, 1976;' and Blackorby, Primont and 
Russell, 1978). Clearly, the validity of these assumptions is an empirical question that cannot be resolved 
with the limited availability of data. The data are sufficient, however, to illustrate the new non-parametric 
methods. 
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Table I: Yearly Per Capita Consumption 
Cities 
Moscow 
Leningrad 
Arkhangel'sk 
Krasnodar 
Khabarovsk 
Moscow 
Leningrad 
Arkhangel'sk 
Krasnodar 
Khabarovsk 
Moscow 
Leningrad 
Arkhangel'sk 
Krasnodar 
Khabarovsk 
Year Meat 
(kg) 
Gl 
1992 11 60 
1992 I2 56 
1992 13 48 
1992 14 58 
1992 15 47 
1993 16 58 
1993 17 54 
1993 18 46 
1993 19 55 
1993 IlO 45 
1994 III 59 
1994 Il2 35 
1994 113 44 
1994 Il4 53 
1994 Il5 41 
Milk 
(liter) 
G2 
300 
281 
200 
207 
202 
316 
281 
218 
206 
171 
281 
276 
206 
244 
171 
Eggs 
(number) 
G3 
279 
424 
232 
242 
206 
280 
368 
217 
206 
213 
272 
320 
200 
208 
196 
Potatoes 
(kg) 
G4 
83 
135 
77 
79 
51 
84 
135 
72 
92 
52 
84 
135 
77 
85 
56 
Source: Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation
 
Table 2: Prices per unit in Roubles at the State Shops
 
Cities Year Meat Milk Eggs Potatoes 
(kg) 
Gl 
(liter) 
G2 
(number) 
G3 
(kg) 
G4 
Moscow 1992 Il 97.67 10.09 4.12 15.27 
Leningrad 
Arkhangel'sk 
Krasnodar 
Khabarovsk 
Moscow 
Leningrad 
Arkhangel'sk 
Krasnodar 
Khabarovsk 
Moscow 
Leningrad 
Arkhangel'sk 
Krasnodar 
Khabarovsk 
1992 I2 
1992 13 
1992 14 
1992 15 
1993 16 
1993 17 
1993 18 
1993 19 
1993 110 
1994 III 
1994 112 
1994 113 
1994 114 
1994 115 
106.82 
114.13 
110.57 
121.90 
1229.92 
1166.28 
1207.61 
1080.95 
1480.43 
3627.86 
3400.19 
3815.13 
2424.38 
4696.19 
14.16 
18.55 
16.95 
23.90 
154.58 
155.64 
188.00 
168.36 
284.54 
718.49 
761.64 
890.38 
646.73 
1486.98 
4.55 
3.79 
3.45 
6.30 
33.23 
31.09 
31.010 
32.23 
36.91 
130.06
 
112.25
 
144.97
 
. 115.44
 
208.78
 
19.56 
20.57 
15.86 
21.54 
127.62 
131.97 
159.74 
104.82 
194.68 
515.06 • 
547.03 
784.35 
546.66 
1013.97 
Source: Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation 
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Table 3: Prices per unit in Roubles at the Alternative Market 
Cities Year Meat Milk Eggs Potatoes 
(kg) (liter) (number) (kg) 
Gl G2 G3 G4 
Moscow 1992 II 366.3 74.3 6.8 31.4 
Leningrad 1992 12 283.7 NA 10.3 25.7 
Arkhangel'sk 1992 I3 168.9 NA NA 40.0 
Krasnodar 1992 14 165.8 24.8 3.8 20.3 
Khabarovsk 1992 15 250.0 62.4 6.3 27.9 
Moscow 1993 16 4,320.4 636.8 61.3 231.3 
Leningrad 1993 17 2,950.8 NA 66.9 151.7 
Arkhangel'sk 1993 18 1,880.9 NA NA 274.9 
Krasnodar 1993 19 1,588.7 179.0 35.5 127.6 
Khabarovsk 1993 IlO 2,899.9 763.4 51.3 250.3 
Moscow 1994 III 10,110.6 2,983.8 213.5 834.1 
Leningrad 1994 Il2 6,555.4 75 179.1 554.2 
Arkhange1'sk 1994 Il3 6,032.6 NA NA 1,014.1 
Krasnodar 1994 Il4 4,036.8 635.2 125.9 566.3 
Khabarovsk 1994 115 7,928.0 3,662.6 422.4 1,207.1 
Source: Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation. 
Test Results for WARP, GARP, MWARP, and MGARP. By executing the GAMS 
codes from Appendix A, we obtain the matrices of violations of WARP and GARP. The 
results are given in Appendix B. 
If the entry Wij of W[ 15,15] matrix IS 1, then we have a violation of the 
conventional WARP, and this violation involves the ith and jth time periods. 
Accordingly, the violation points are: (16,11), (14,112), (19,112), (11,16), (112,14), (112,19). 
Having obtained the violations of the conventional WARP, the modified WARP is 
applied to detect the true violations of WARP. For this purpose, we need the prices at the 
alternative market and, fortunately, there are no missing data in Table 3 for the cases of 
• 
...interest, which are 11,16,14,19, and 112.. 
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To check MWARP, we start with the case of (11,16). Below, we present how 
MWARP is checked for this case. We apply the MWARP algorithm from above in a 
straightforward fashion: 
A.	 Detect a violation case of the conventional WARP, W16=W61 = I in the matrix W. 
B.	 Make a row F1,6 as follows: From Table 1, subtract consumption row of time period 
16 from the consumption row of time period II: 
C. Then, we form a new row of prices, H I ,6[l,4]: if the kth element of F I ,6 is positive, 
then the kth element of the new price row, hk, is equal to the element (16,GK) of the 
matrix of alternative market prices (Table 3), otherwise hk is equal to (16,GK) 
element of the matrix of state shops prices (Table 2). 
H I ,6= (4320.4,155.64,310.91,131.97) 
D. Calculate M 1,6 and M6,1 
M 1,6 = (2,-16,-1,-1)-(4320.4,154.58,33.225, 127.62l= 6006.74 
M6,1 =1031.99 
E. As M I ,6 >0 and M6,1 >0, the case of Wl6 and W61 is not a true violation; MWARP is 
satisfied, although the conventional WARP is violated. 
Applying the same algorithm to calculate M4,12 M9,12 M 12,4 M12,9, we have: 
M4,12 = 58832 and M 12,4 = 599 
M9,12 = 41475 and M 12,9 = 438 
The conventional WARP produced 6 cases of violation for consumer behavior. • 
... 
However, MWARP applied to these pseudo violations shows no cases of true violation. 
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Now we must turn our attention to the cases where GARP is violated. From 
Appendix B, these are:
 
(16,11), (14,112), (19,112), (11,16), (112,14), (112,19), (14,19) and (19,14).
 
The list of GARP violations must include all the violations of WARP; there are two
 
additional violations, namely, (14,19) and (19,14).
 
To conduct MGARP, we must apply the modification to the list of violations of 
GARP. M 1,6 and M6,1 , M4,12 and M9,12 , M 12,4 and M 12,9 are calculated for MWARP and 
they are the same for MGARP. The only new point to which we must apply MGARP is 
(14,19) and (19,14). For this purpose M4,9 and M9,4 must be calculated from the MGARP 
algorithm above: 
A.	 Detect a violation case of the conventional GARP, g49=g94 = 1 in the matrix G. 
B.	 Make a row F4§ From Table 1, subtract consumption row of time period 19 from the 
consumption row of time period 14:
 
F4,9[1,4] = X4[1,4]-X9[1.4] = (3,1,36,-13)
 
C.	 Then, form a new row of prices, H4,9[1,4]: 
if the kth element of F4,9 is positive, then the kth element of the new price row, hk, is 
equal to the element (19,GK) of the matrix of alternative market prices (Table 3), 
otherwise hk is equal to (l9,GK) element of the matrix of state shops prices (Table 2). 
H4,9= (1588, 179, 35, 105) 
D.	 Calculate M4,9 and M9,4 
-
M4,9 = (3,1,36,-13) (1588, 179,35, 105l= 4838
 
M9,4 = (-3,-1,-36,13) (110.5, 16.95,3.446, 20.3l=-264
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E.	 Since M4,9 >0, there is no true violation at (14,19). However, M9,4 =-264<0, which 
indicates that the violation at the point (19,14) is a true violation of GARP. 
A summary. In terms of conventional WARP, only 6 violations (from a possible 
105) were found, involving 5 observations. The modified WARP applied to the same 
data set shows no cases of true violations. All six violations of the conventional WARP 
were pseudo violations, i.e. the case described in the Figure 2. 
With respect to the conventional GARP, there were 8 observations involved in the 
violations, however, no additional data points were involved. The modified GARP 
applied to the same data set shows only one true violation, the other seven were pseudo 
violations. The only violation sample observation is (19,14) and the visual inspection 
shows that this violation represents bundles such as Xj and Xk from Figure 2, but both 
bundles are very close to the intersection point of the budget lines. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we modify the non-parametric tests of the axioms of revealed 
preference to examme consumer behavior and the notion of consumer rationality m 
transition economies by recognizing explicitly the existence of both a state market and an 
emerging private market. To reflect the unique characteristics of transition economies, 
shortages are allowed in the state market, while not in the private market. 
Because of the way the modified tests are constructed, data for prices in both the 
state and private markets are needed, as are data on purchases from state markets. 
Through some convenient algebraic substitutions, the tests do not require data on actual 
quantities purchased in the private markets. This feature of the modified tests is 
20
 
especially important, given the near impossibility of gaining access to data on sales or 
purchases from private markets in transition economies. 
The method is demonstrated using aggregate consumption data for four important 
food items in five cities of the former Soviet Union. Although data are limited, we 
demonstrate that if observed purchases from state shops are due to shortages in the supply 
of some goods, the conventional non-parametric tests can lead to an erroneous rejection 
of the rationality hypothesis of consumer behavior in transition economies. Clearly, if 
consumption data from private markets were available, one could interpret the results of 
these modified tests with greater confidence. 
Although the focus here is on dealing with the effects of shortages in state 
markets, there are other situations for which similar modified non-parametric tests might 
shed light on the rationality of consumer behavior. In transition economies, for example, 
one could account for differential product quality or the implicit value for time if there are 
long queries required for state shop purchases. In developed economies, on the other 
hand, many two-career households have high incomes, but face severe time constraints. 
To accommodate busy schedules, these households are increasing their relevance on 
alternative markets. They have purchased more meals outside the home and have 
increased dramatically their purchases through direct TV marketing, on-line purchases via 
the Internet, catalog shopping, and purchases through factory outlet stores. In future 
years, an understanding of consumer behavior will require explicit recognition of these 
•
alternatives to conventional shopping. 
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Appendix A 
*This program tests the WARP and GARP hypotheses. 
SETS 
I observations /11 *115/
 
G goods /Meat, Milk, Eggs, Potatoes/;
 
• 
ALIAS (I,J,K); 
SCALAR
 
PjXj
 
PjXi;
 
PARAMETER 
R(I,J) ratios of expenditures 
M(I,J) Varian's Mmatrix 
MT(I,J) Varian's MTmatrix 
WARP(I,J) matrix of WARP results 
GARP(I,J) matrix of GARP results; 
TABLE P(I,G) observed prices 
Meat Milk Eggs Potatoes 
11 97.67 10.09 4.115 15.27 
12 106.82 14.16 4.554 19.56 
I3 114.13 18.55 3.790 20.57 
14 110.57 16.95 3.446 15.86 
15 121.90 23.90 6.309 21.54 
16 1229.92 154.58 33.225 127.62 
17 1166.28 155.64 31.091 131.97 
18 1207.61 188.00 31.099 159.74 
19 1080.95 168.36 32.228 104.82 
11 0 1480.43 284.54 36.93 194.68 
III 3627.86718.49 130.058515.06 
112 3400.19761.64 112.245547.03 
113 3815.13890.38 144.972784.35 
114 2424.38646.73 115.443546.66 
-
115 4696.19 1486.98208.776 1013.97; 
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TABLE X(I,G) consumption 
Meat Milk Eggs Potatoes 
11 60 300 279 83 
12 56 281 424 135 
13 48 200 232 77 
14 58 207 242 79 
15 50 191 245 157 
16 58 316 280 84 
17 54 281 368 135 
18 46 218 217 72 
19 55 206 206 129 
110 47 191 234 52 
III 59 281 272 84 
112 35 276 320 135 
113 44 206 200 77 
114 53 244 208 85 
115 47 173 189 87; 
* Computation of expenditure ratios and Varian's M matrix 
LOOP(J, 
PjXj = SUM(G,P(J,G)*X(J,G»; 
LOOP(I, 
PjXi = SUM(G,P(J,G)*X(I,G»;
 
R(I,J) = PjXilPjXj;
 
M(I,J) = 1$(R(I,J) LE 1 AND R(J,I) LE 1);

»;
 
LOOP(K, 
LOOP(I, 
LOOP(J, 
MT(I,J) $ (M(I,K)=1 AND M(K,J)=I) = 1; 
))); 
LOOP(I, 
LOOP(J, 
WARP(I,J) = 1 $(M(I,J)=1 AND M(J,I) EQ 1); 
GARP(I,J) = 1 $(MT(I,J)=1 AND MT(J,I) EQ 1);
»;
 
DISPLAY WARP, GARP; 
..
i 
! 
i 
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Appendix B 
r 
Table B.1. Violations of WARP 
Il I2 I3 /4 /5 /6 I7 /8 /9 IlO /11 Il2 Il3 Il4 Il5 
11 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
112 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table B.2. Violations of GARP 
Il 
0 
/2 
0 
I3 
0 
/4 
0 
/5 
0 
/6 
1 
/7 
0 
/8 
0 
/9 
0 
IlO 
0 
/II 
0 
Il2 
0 
Il3 
0 
//4 
0 
Il5 
011 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-112 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ... 
114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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